

WHOLE MIND

Tutorial Series Two

The Body, The Soul, And The Paradox That Is Man

T01: Excerpted from Phaedrus By Plato; Written 360 B.C.E; Translated by Benjamin Jowett.

Persons of the Dialogue: SOCRATES; PHAEDRUS.

Scene: Under a plane-tree, by the banks of the Ilissus.

Socrates. My dear Phaedrus, whence come you, and whither are you going?

Phaedrus. I come from Lysias the son of Cephalus, and I am going to take a walk outside the wall, for I have been sitting with him the whole morning; and our common friend Acumenus tells me that it is much more refreshing to walk in the open air than to be shut up in a cloister.

[In progress:] Socrates is speaking. ...And therefore, let no one frighten or flutter us by saying that the temperate friend is to be chosen rather than the inspired, but let him further show that love is not sent by the gods for any good to lover or beloved; if he can do so we will allow him to carry off the palm. And we, on our part, will prove in answer to him that the madness of love is the greatest of heaven's blessings, and the proof shall be one which the wise will receive, and the witling disbelieve. But first of all, let us view the affections and actions of the soul divine and human, and try to ascertain the truth about them. The beginning of our proof is as follows:-

The soul through all her being is immortal, for that which is ever in motion is immortal; but that which moves another and is moved by another, in ceasing to move ceases also to live. Only the self-moving, never leaving self, never ceases to move, and is the fountain and beginning of motion to all that moves besides. Now, the beginning is unbegotten, for that which is begotten has a beginning; but the beginning is begotten of nothing, for if it were begotten of something, then the begotten would not come from a beginning. But if unbegotten, it must also be indestructible; for if beginning were destroyed, there could be no beginning out of anything, nor anything out of a beginning; and all things must have a beginning. And therefore the self-moving is the beginning of motion; and this can neither be destroyed nor begotten, else the whole heavens and all creation would collapse and stand still, and never again have motion or birth. But if the self-moving is proved to be immortal, he who affirms that self-motion is the very idea and essence of the soul will not be put to confusion. For the body which is moved from without is soulless; but that which is moved from within has a soul, for such is the nature of the soul. But if this be true, must not the soul be the self-moving, and therefore of necessity unbegotten and immortal? Enough of the soul's immortality.

Of the nature of the soul, though her true form be ever a theme of large and more than mortal discourse, let me speak briefly, and in a figure. And let the figure be composite—a pair of winged horses and a charioteer. Now the winged horses and the charioteers of the gods are all of them noble and of noble descent, but those of other races are mixed; the human charioteer drives his in a pair; and one of them is noble and of noble breed, and the other is ignoble and of ignoble breed; and the

driving of them of necessity gives a great deal of trouble to him. I will endeavour to explain to you in what way the mortal differs from the immortal creature. The soul in her totality has the care of inanimate being everywhere, and traverses the whole heaven in divers forms appearing--when perfect and fully winged she soars upward, and orders the whole world; whereas the imperfect soul, losing her wings and drooping in her flight at last settles on the solid ground--there, finding a home, she receives an earthly frame which appears to be self-moved, but is really moved by her power; and this composition of soul and body is called a living and mortal creature. For immortal no such union can be reasonably believed to be; although fancy, not having seen nor surely known the nature of God, may imagine an immortal creature having both a body and also a soul which are united throughout all time. Let that, however, be as God wills, and be spoken of acceptably to him. And now let us ask the reason why the soul loses her wings!

The wing is the corporeal element which is most akin to the divine, and which by nature tends to soar aloft and carry that which gravitates downwards into the upper region, which is the habitation of the gods. The divine is beauty, wisdom, goodness, and the like; and by these the wing of the soul is nourished, and grows apace; but when fed upon evil and foulness and the opposite of good, wastes and falls away. Zeus, the mighty lord, holding the reins of a winged chariot, leads the way in heaven, ordering all and taking care of all; and there follows him the array of gods and demigods, marshalled in eleven bands; Hestia alone abides at home in the house of heaven; of the rest they who are reckoned among the princely twelve march in their appointed order. They see many blessed sights in the inner heaven, and there are many ways to and fro, along which the blessed gods are

passing, every one doing his own work; he may follow who will and can, for jealousy has no place in the celestial choir. But when they go to banquet and festival, then they move up the steep to the top of the vault of heaven. The chariots of the gods in even poise, obeying the rein, glide rapidly; but the others labour, for the vicious steed goes heavily, weighing down the charioteer to the earth when his steed has not been thoroughly trained:-and this is the hour of agony and extremest conflict for the soul. For the immortals, when they are at the end of their course, go forth and stand upon the outside of heaven, and the revolution of the spheres carries them round, and they behold the things beyond. But of the heaven which is above the heavens, what earthly poet ever did or ever will sing worthily? It is such as I will describe; for I must dare to speak the truth, when truth is my theme.

There abides the very being with which true knowledge is concerned; the colourless, formless, intangible essence, visible only to mind, the pilot of the soul. The divine intelligence, being nurtured upon mind and pure knowledge, and the intelligence of every soul which is capable of receiving the food proper to it, rejoices at beholding reality, and once more gazing upon truth, is replenished and made glad, until the revolution of the worlds brings her round again to the same place. In the revolution she beholds justice, and temperance, and knowledge absolute, not in the form of generation or of relation, which men call existence, but knowledge absolute in existence absolute; and beholding the other true existences in like manner, and feasting upon them, she passes down into the interior of the heavens and returns home; and there the charioteer putting up his horses at the stall, gives them ambrosia to eat and nectar to drink.

Such is the life of the gods; but of other souls, that which follows God best and is

likest to him lifts the head of the charioteer into the outer world, and is carried round in the revolution, troubled indeed by the steeds, and with difficulty beholding true being; while another only rises and falls, and sees, and again fails to see by reason of the unruliness of the steeds. The rest of the souls are also longing after the upper world and they all follow, but not being strong enough they are carried round below the surface, plunging, treading on one another, each striving to be first; and there is confusion and perspiration and the extremity of effort; and many of them are lamed or have their wings broken through the ill-driving of the charioteers; and all of them after a fruitless toil, not having attained to the mysteries of true being, go away, and feed upon opinion. The reason why the souls exhibit this exceeding eagerness to behold the plain of truth is that pasturage is found there, which is suited to the highest part of the soul; and the wing on which the soul soars is nourished with this. And there is a law of Destiny, that the soul which attains any vision of truth in company with a god is preserved from harm until the next period, and if attaining always is always unharmed. But when she is unable to follow, and fails to behold the truth, and through some ill-hap sinks beneath the double load of forgetfulness and vice, and her wings fall from her and she drops to the ground, then the law ordains that this soul shall at her first birth pass, not into any other animal, but only into man; and the soul which has seen most of truth shall come to the birth as a philosopher, or artist, or some musical and loving nature; that which has seen truth in the second degree shall be some righteous king or warrior chief; the soul which is of the third class shall be a politician, or economist, or trader; the fourth shall be lover of gymnastic toils, or a physician; the fifth shall lead the life of a prophet or hierophant; to the sixth the character of poet or some other imitative artist will be assigned; to the seventh the life of an artisan or husbandman; to the eighth that of a sophist or demagogue; to the ninth that of a tyrant-all these are states of

probation, in which he who does righteously improves, and he who does unrighteously, deteriorates his lot.

Ten thousand years must elapse before the soul of each one can return to the place from whence she came, for she cannot grow her wings in less; only the soul of a philosopher, guileless and true, or the soul of a lover, who is not devoid of philosophy, may acquire wings in the third of the recurring periods of a thousand years; he is distinguished from the ordinary good man who gains wings in three thousand years:-and they who choose this life three times in succession have wings given them, and go away at the end of three thousand years. But the others receive judgment when they have completed their first life, and after the judgment they go, some of them to the houses of correction which are under the earth, and are punished; others to some place in heaven whither they are lightly borne by justice, and there they live in a manner worthy of the life which they led here when in the form of men. And at the end of the first thousand years the good souls and also the evil souls both come to draw lots and choose their second life, and they may take any which they please. The soul of a man may pass into the life of a beast, or from the beast return again into the man. But the soul which has never seen the truth will not pass into the human form. For a man must have intelligence of universals, and be able to proceed from the many particulars of sense to one conception of reason;-this is the recollection of those things which our soul once saw while following God-when regardless of that which we now call being she raised her head up towards the true being. And therefore the mind of the philosopher alone has wings; and this is just, for he is always, according to the measure of his abilities, clinging in recollection to those things in which God abides, and in beholding which He is what He is. And he who employs aright these memories is ever being initiated into perfect mysteries and alone becomes truly perfect. But, as he forgets earthly interests and is rapt in the divine,

the vulgar deem him mad, and rebuke him; they do not see that he is inspired.

Thus far I have been speaking of the fourth and last kind of madness, which is imputed to him who, when he sees the beauty of earth, is transported with the recollection of the true beauty; he would like to fly away, but he cannot; he is like a bird fluttering and looking upward and careless of the world below; and he is therefore thought to be mad. And I have shown this of all inspirations to be the noblest and highest and the offspring of the highest to him who has or shares in it, and that he who loves the beautiful is called a lover because he partakes of it. For, as has been already said, every soul of man has in the way of nature beheld true being; this was the condition of her passing into the form of man. But all souls do not easily recall the things of the other world; they may have seen them for a short time only, or they may have been unfortunate in their earthly lot, and, having had their hearts turned to unrighteousness through some corrupting influence, they may have lost the memory of the holy things which once they saw. Few only retain an adequate remembrance of them; and they, when they behold here any image of that other world, are rapt in amazement; but they are ignorant of what this rapture means, because they do not clearly perceive. For there is no light of justice or temperance or any of the higher ideas which are precious to souls in the earthly copies of them: they are seen through a glass dimly; and there are few who, going to the images, behold in them the realities, and these only with difficulty. There was a time when with the rest of the happy band they saw beauty shining in brightness—we philosophers following in the train of Zeus, others in company with other gods; and then we beheld the beatific vision and were initiated into a mystery which may be truly called most blessed, celebrated by us in our state of innocence, before we had any experience of evils to come, when we were admitted to the sight of apparitions innocent and simple

and calm and happy, which we beheld shining impure light, pure ourselves and not yet enshrined in that living tomb which we carry about, now that we are imprisoned in the body, like an oyster in his shell. Let me linger over the memory of scenes which have passed away.

T02: Excerpted from Christoph Cardinal Schonborn's Foreword to, Man And Woman He Created Them: A Theology Of The Body, by Pope John Paul II. Translated by Michael Waldstein, C-2006, Pauline Publications, pages XXV and XXVI.
Emphasis added.

On the basis of his defense of ordinary human reason in the experience of love between man and woman, John Paul the Second unfolds a theological argument that is in many respects new in Catholic magisterial teaching. Allow me to mention three of his striking theses. The image of God is found in man and woman above all in the communion of love between them, which reflects the communion of love between the persons of the Trinity (T O B 9:3). In God's design, the spousal union of man and woman is the original effective sign through which holiness entered the world (T O B 19:5). This visible sign of marriage "in the beginning" is connected with the visible sign of Christ's spousal love for the Church and is thus the foundation of the whole sacramental order (T O B 95b:7). **These and the many related theses contained in the theology of the body will occupy theologians for a long time and lead to a renewal of theology as a whole.** As Professor Waldstein shows in his Introduction, John Paul the Second's teaching even if it is in some respects new is deeply rooted in the Catholic tradition, above all in St.

John of the Cross.

T03: Sensuality

Until further notice, the following questions and articles are excerpted from:

Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae Translated by Alfred J. Freddoso, University of Notre Dame

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First Part, QUESTION 75: The Essence of the Human Soul

Now that we have considered the spiritual creature and the corporeal creature, we must consider man, who is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal substance (ex spirituali et corporali substantia componitur). We will consider first the nature of man

(questions 75-89) and then the production of man (questions 90-102).

Now the theologian's role is to consider man's nature with respect to the soul and not the body, except insofar as the body is related to the soul. And so the first part of our consideration will have to do with the soul. Since, according to Dionysius, De Caelesti Hierarchia, chap. 11, there are three aspects of spiritual substances, viz., their essence, their power, and their operation, we will consider, first, that which has to do with the essence of the soul (questions 75-76); second, that which has to do with the soul's powers or capacities (virtutem vel potentias) (questions

77-83); and, third, that which has to do with the soul's operations (questions 84-89).

On the first point there are two things to consider. The first is the soul itself in its own right (question 75), and the second is the union of the soul with the body (question 76).

On the first topic there are seven questions:

- (1) Is a soul a body?
- (2) Is the human soul something subsistent?
- (3) Are the souls of brute animals subsistent?
- (4) Is the soul a man or is a man instead something composed of a soul and a body? ...

First Part: TREATISE ON MAN

75. Of Man Who Is Composed of a Spiritual and a Corporeal Substance: and in the First Place, Concerning What Belongs to the Essence of the Soul

76. Of the Union of Body and Soul

77. Of Those Things Which Belong to the Powers of the Soul in General

78. Of the Specific Powers of the Soul

79. Of the Intellectual Powers

80. Of the Appetitive Powers in General

81. Of the Power of Sensuality

- 82. Of the Will
- 83. Of Free-Will
- 84. How the Soul While United to the Body Understands Corporeal Things beneath It
- 85. Of the Mode and Order of Understanding
- 86. What Our Intellect Knows in Material Things
- 87. How the Intellectual Soul Knows Itself and All Within Itself
- 88. How the Human Soul Knows What Is above Itself
- 89. Of the Knowledge of the Separated Soul
- 90. Of the First Production of Man's Soul
- 91. The Production of the First Man's Body...

T04: The Sentient Appetite: First Part, Question 81

##

First Part, QUESTION 81

Next we have to consider sensuality or the sentient appetite (*sensualitas*). And on this topic there are three questions:

- (1) Is sensuality a purely appetitive power?
- (2) Is it divided into the irascible and the concupiscible as into diverse powers?
- (3) Do the irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason?

##

First Part, QUESTION 81, Article 1

Is sensuality a purely appetitive power?

It seems that sensuality (sensualitas) is not a purely appetitive power, but a cognitive power as well:

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Objection 1: In De Trinitate 12 Augustine says, "The soul's sensual movement, which is concentrated in the bodily senses, is common to us and the beasts." But the bodily senses fall under the cognitive powers. Therefore, sensuality is a cognitive power.

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Objection 2: Whatever falls under the same division seems to belong to the same genus. But in De Trinitate 12 Augustine divides sensuality off against higher reason and lower reason, both of which involve cognition. Therefore, sensuality is likewise a cognitive power.

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Objection 3: In a man's temptations sensuality takes the place of the serpent. But in

the temptation of the first parents the serpent's role was to introduce and propose the sin, and this role belongs to a cognitive power. Therefore, sensuality is a cognitive power.

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But contrary to this: Sensuality is defined as "a desire for things that have to do with the body."

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I respond: The name 'sensuality' (sensualitas) seems to be taken from sensual movement' (sensualis motus) which is what Augustine is talking about in De Trinitate 12 in the way that the name of a power is taken from its act, e.g., the visual power (visus) from the act of seeing (visio). Now sensual movement is a desire (appetitus) that follows upon sentient apprehension. For an act of the apprehensive power is not called a movement in as proper a sense as the action of the appetitive power is, since the apprehensive power's operation finds its perfection in the fact that the things apprehended exist in the one apprehending them, whereas the appetitive power's operation finds its perfection in the fact that the one who has the desire is inclined toward the desirable thing. And so the apprehensive power's operation is more like rest, whereas the operation of an appetitive power is more like a movement. Hence, sensual movement' means the operation of an appetitive power. And so 'sensuality' is a name of the sentient appetite.

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Reply to objection 1: Augustine's claim that the soul's sensual movement is concentrated in the bodily senses means not that the senses are included under sensuality, but rather that the movement of sensuality is a certain inclination toward the bodily senses, viz., when we desire the things that are apprehended by the bodily senses. And in this way the bodily senses are, as it were, entries (praeambulae) into sensuality.

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Reply to objection 2: Sensuality is divided off from higher reason and lower reason insofar as they all share in the act of motion. For the cognitive power, which is what higher and lower reason belong to, is a power that effects movement, just like the appetitive power, which sensuality belongs to.

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Reply to objection 3: The serpent not only displayed and proposed the sin, but also incited them to commit the sin (inclinavit in effectum peccati). And it is in this last respect that sensuality is signified by the serpent.

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First Part, QUESTION 81, Article 2

Is the sentient appetite divided into the irascible and the concupiscible as into diverse powers?

It seems that the sentient appetite is not divided into the irascible (irascibilis) and the concupiscible (concupiscibilis) as into diverse powers:

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Objection 1: As De Anima 2 explains, the same power of the soul is related to a pair of contraries, in the way that the power of seeing is related to both white and black. But the agreeable (conveniens) and the harmful (nocivum) are contraries. Therefore, since the concupiscible has to do with the agreeable and the irascible with the harmful, it seems to be the same power of the soul that is both irascible and concupiscible.

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Objection 2: The sentient appetite is directed only at things that are agreeable to

the senses. But what is agreeable to the senses is the object of the concupiscible power. Therefore, there is no sentient appetitive power that differs from the concupiscible power.

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Objection 3: Hatred (odium) resides in the irascible power; for in Super Matthaem Jerome says, "Let us have in the irascible power a hatred for vices." But since hatred is the contrary of love (amor), it is in the concupiscible power. Therefore, the same power is both concupiscible and irascible.

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But contrary to this: Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene posit two powers, the irascible and the concupiscible, as parts of the sentient appetite.

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I respond: The sentient appetite is generically one faculty (una vis), which is called sensuality, but it is divided into two powers, which are the species of the sentient appetite, viz., the irascible and the concupiscible. To see this clearly, consider that in a natural corruptible thing there has to be not only (a) an inclination toward pursuing what is agreeable and avoiding what is harmful, but also (b) an inclination toward resisting the corrupting or contrary things that pose an obstacle to what is agreeable and that inflict what is harmful in just the way that fire has a natural inclination not only (a) to recede from a lower place that is not agreeable to

it and to tend toward a higher place that is agreeable to it, but also (b) to resist what corrupts it or impedes it. Therefore, since the sentient appetite is an inclination that follows upon sentient apprehension in the way that a natural appetite is an inclination that follows upon a natural form, it must be the case that in the sentient part of the soul there are two appetitive powers: (a) one through which the soul is simply inclined to pursue those things that are agreeable according to the senses and to avoid those things that are harmful, and this is called the concupiscible power; and (b) a second through which the animal resists aggressors that pose obstacles to what is agreeable and that inflict harm, and this is called the irascible power. Hence, the object of the irascible power is said to be what is difficult (*arduum*), because the irascible power tends toward overcoming contraries and winning out over them. Moreover, these two inclinations are not reducible to a single principle. For sometimes the soul, in opposition to the inclination of the concupiscible power, inflicts hardships upon itself in order to fight off contraries in accord with the inclination of the irascible power. The passions of the irascible power even seem to fight against the passions of the concupiscible power, since, in most cases, aroused concupiscence diminishes anger, and aroused anger diminishes concupiscence. This point is also clear from the fact that the irascible power is, as it were, a promoter and defender of the concupiscible power when it rises up against obstacles to those agreeable things sought by the concupiscible power, and when it fights against the harmful things that the concupiscible power shrinks from. And for this reason all the passions of the irascible power take their origin from passions of the concupiscible power and terminate in the latter. For instance, anger arises from an inflicted pain and, having gained vengeance, terminates in joy. It is also for this reason that, as is explained in *De Animalibus* 8, struggles among animals are over concupiscible objects like food and sexual pleasure.

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Reply to objection 1: The concupiscible power is directed toward both the agreeable and the disagreeable. By contrast, the irascible power is directed toward resisting the disagreeable that stands in opposition to it.

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Reply to objection 2: Just as, in keeping with what was pointed out above (q. 78, a. 2), among the apprehensive powers of the sentient part of the soul there is an estimative power that perceives things that do not affect the sensory powers, so also in the sentient appetite there is a power that does not seek what is appropriate for delighting the senses, but instead seeks something that is appropriate insofar as it is useful to the animal for its own defense. And this is the irascible power.

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Reply to objection 3: Hatred absolutely speaking belongs to the concupiscible power. However, because of the pugnacity caused by hatred, it can also be relevant to the irascible power.

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First Part, QUESTION 81, Article 3

Do the irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason?

It seems that the irascible and concupiscible powers do not obey reason:

Objection 1: The irascible and concupiscible powers are parts of sensuality. But sensuality does not obey reason; this is why it is signified by the serpent, as Augustine points out in *De Trinitate* 12. Therefore, the irascible and concupiscible powers do not obey reason.

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Objection 2: Whatever obeys a given thing does not fight against it. But the irascible and concupiscible powers fight against reason this according to the Apostle in *Romans* 7:23 ("But I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind"). Therefore, the irascible and concupiscible powers do not obey reason.

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Objection 3: Just as the appetitive power is lower than the rational part of the soul, so too is the sentient [apprehensive] power. But the sentient [apprehensive] part of the soul does not obey reason, since we do not hear or see when we want to. Therefore, it is likewise not the case that the powers of the sentient appetite, viz., the irascible and the concupiscible, obey reason.

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But contrary to this: Damascene says that what is "obedient to" reason and susceptible to persuasion "by reason is divided into concupiscence (concupiscentia) and anger (ira)."

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I respond: There are two ways in which the irascible and concupiscible powers obey the higher part of the soul, where one finds the intellect (or reason) and will. The first of these ways has to do with reason, and the second has to do with the will. The irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason with respect to their acts. The explanation for this is that in the other animals the sentient appetite is apt to be moved by the estimative power, in the way that a sheep, taking the wolf to be an enemy, fears it. But as was explained above (q. 78, a. 4), in man the estimative power is replaced by the cogitative power, which some call 'particular reason' because it brings together intentions of individuals (collativa intentionum individualium). This is why the sentient appetite is apt to be moved by the cogitative power in a man. Now particular reason is itself apt to be moved and directed by 'universal reason', and so there are syllogisms in which singular conclusions are derived from universal propositions. Thus, it is clear that universal reason gives commands to (imperat) the sentient appetite, which is divided into the concupiscible and irascible, and that this appetite obeys it. And since deriving singular conclusions from universal principles is the work of discursive reason and not of simple intellectual understanding (non est opus simplicis intellectus sed rationis), the irascible and concupiscible powers are said to obey reason rather than the intellect. Moreover, anyone can experience within

himself that when he applies universal considerations, anger and fear and other such [passions] are mitigated or, as the case may be, instigated. Likewise, the sentient appetite is subject to the will as regards execution, which is brought about by the power that effects movement. For in the other animals movement follows immediately upon an appetitive act (appetitum) of the concupiscible and irascible powers; for instance, when the sheep becomes fearful of the wolf, it immediately flees, since in sheep there is no higher appetitive act that might resist this movement. By contrast, a man is not immediately moved by an appetitive act of the concupiscible or irascible powers; rather, he awaits the command of the will (*expectatur imperium voluntatis*), which is a higher appetite. For in the case of all ordered powers that effect movement, a mover effects movement only by the power of the first mover; thus, the lower appetite is not sufficient to effect movement unless the higher appetite consents which is what the Philosopher is saying in *De Anima* 3: "The higher appetite moves the lower appetite in the way that a higher sphere moves a lower sphere." Therefore, these are the ways in which the irascible and concupiscible powers are subject to reason.

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Reply to objection 1: Sensuality is signified by the serpent as regards what is proper to the sentient part of the soul, whereas 'irascible' and 'concupiscible' name the sentient appetite as regards its act, to which the irascible and concupiscible powers are induced by reason, as has been explained.

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Reply to objection 2: As the Philosopher says in Politics 1, "One finds in the animal both despotic rule (despoticus principatus) and constitutional rule (politicus principatus). For the soul rules the body with a despotic rule, whereas the intellect rules the appetite with a constitutional and royal rule." Despotic rule is that by which someone rules slaves, who do not have the ability to resist the ruler in any of his commands, since they have nothing of their own (quia nihil sui habent). By contrast, political and royal rule is that by which someone rules free men, who, even if they are subject to the rule of the leader, nonetheless have something of their own (habent aliquid proprium) by which they are able to resist the leader's command. So, then, the soul is said to rule the body with despotic rule because the bodily members cannot in any way resist the soul's rule, but instead at the soul's desire the hand and foot move immediately, along with any member of the body that is apt to be moved by a voluntary movement. By contrast, the intellect, i.e., reason, is said to rule the irascible and concupiscible powers with constitutional rule, since the sentient appetite has something of its own by which it is able to resist reason's command. For the sentient appetite is apt to be moved not only by the estimative power in other animals and the cogitative power (which is ruled by universal reason) in man, but also by the power of imagining and the sensory power. Hence, we experience the irascible and concupiscible powers resisting reason when we sense or imagine something pleasant that reason forbids, or something unpleasant that reason prescribes. And so the fact that the irascible and concupiscible powers fight against reason in some cases does not rule out their being obedient to reason.

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Reply to objection 3: The exterior sensory powers need for their acts exterior sensible things by which they are affected and whose presence is not within reason's power. By contrast, the interior powers, both appetitive and apprehensive, do not need exterior things. And so they are subject to the command of reason, which is able not only to instigate or mitigate the affections of the appetitive power, but also to form the phantasms that belong to the power of imagining.

T05: The Passions: First of the Second Part, Questions 22 and 23

##

First of the Second Part, QUESTION 22

After this we have to consider the passions of the soul, first in general (questions 22-25) and then in particular (questions 26-48).

In the general treatment, there are four things to consider about the passions: first, their subject (question 22); second, the differences among them (question 23); third, their relation to one another (question 24); and, fourth, their badness and goodness (question 25).

On the first topic there are three questions:

- (1) Are there passions in the soul?
- (2) Does a passion exist in the appetitive part of the soul rather than in the apprehensive part?
- (3) Does a passion exist in the sentient appetite rather than in the intellective appetite, which is called the will?

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First of the Second Part, QUESTION 22, Article 1

Are there passions in the soul?

It seems that there are no passions in the soul (*nulla passio sit in anima*):

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Objection 1: To be acted upon (pati) is proper to matter. But as was established in the First Part (ST 1, q. 75, a. 5), the soul is not composed of matter and form. Therefore, there are no passions in the soul.

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Objection 2: As Physics 3 says, a passion is a movement. But as is proved in De Anima 1, the soul does not undergo movement (anima non movetur). Therefore, there are no passions in the soul.

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Objection 3: A passion is a path toward corruption, since, as Topics says, "Every passion, when made stronger, takes away from the substance (abicit a substantia)." But the soul is incorruptible. Therefore, there are no passions in the soul.

#

But contrary to this: In Romans 7:5 the Apostle says, "When we were in the flesh, the passions of the sins which were by the law were working in our members." But sins properly speaking exist in the soul. Therefore, the passions, which are here said to belong to the sins, likewise exist in the soul.

#

I respond: There are three ways in which something is said to be acted upon (*pati dicitur tripliciter*).

In one way, 'to be acted upon' is used generally, insofar as every instance of receiving something is an instance of being acted upon, even if nothing is taken away from the thing in question; in this sense the air is said to be acted upon when it is illuminated. However, properly speaking, this is to be perfected rather than acted upon.

In a second sense, something is said to be acted upon, properly speaking, when one thing is received along with the loss of something else. But there are two ways in which this happens:

(a) Sometimes what is taken away is not agreeable to the thing. For instance, when an animal's body is healed, it is said to be acted upon, since it receives health while losing sickness. (b) Sometimes the reverse happens. For instance, getting sick is said to be an instance of being acted upon, since infirmity is received while health is lost. And this is the most proper sense of 'passion' or 'to be acted upon' (*hic est propriissimus modus passionis*). For 'to be acted upon' is taken from the fact that something is drawn toward the agent, and that which withdraws from what is agreeable to it seems especially to be drawn toward something else.

Similarly, *De Generatione et Corruptione* 1 says that when what is more noble is generated from what is less noble there is a generation absolutely speaking (*generatio simpliciter*), but when what is less noble is generated from what is more noble there is, conversely, a generation in a certain respect (*generatio secundum quid*). These are the three ways in which passions can exist in the soul. For in the sense of just receiving, sensing and intellectual understanding are a certain sort of being acted upon (*sentire et intelligere est quoddam pati*). On the other hand, a

passion with a loss occurs only through a bodily change (secundum transmutationem corporalem), and so a passion properly speaking belongs to the soul only per accidens-viz., insofar as the composite is acted upon. But even here there is a difference, since the sort of change in question has the character of a passion more properly when it is a change for the worse than when it is a change for the better. Hence, sadness (tristitia) is more properly a passion than joy (laetitia) is.

#

Reply to objection 1: Insofar as being acted upon comes with a loss and a change, it is proper to matter and so is found only in things composed of matter and form. But insofar as being acted upon implies just the reception of something, it does not have to belong just to matter, but is instead able to belong to whatever is in potentiality.

Now even though the soul is not composed of matter and form, it nonetheless does have some potentiality, and accordingly it is suited for receiving and being acted upon. This is the sense in which, as De Anima 3 says, to understand intellectually is to be acted upon (intelligere pati est).

#

Reply to objection 2: Even if being acted upon and undergoing movement do not belong to the soul per se, they do belong to it per accidens, as De Anima 1 points out.

#

Reply to objection 3: This argument goes through with respect to passions that are accompanied by a change for the worse. This sort of passion belongs to the soul only per accidens, whereas it belongs per se to the composite, which is indeed corruptible.

##

First of the Second Part, QUESTION 22, Article 2

Are the passions in the apprehensive part of the soul more than in the appetitive part?

It seems that the passions are in the apprehensive part of the soul more than in the appetitive part:

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Objection 1: As Metaphysics 2 says, what is first in a genus seems to be the greatest of the things belonging to that genus and to be a cause of the others. But the passions are in the apprehensive part before being in the appetitive part; for the appetitive part is not acted upon except when the apprehensive part has previously been acted upon (*non patitur pars appetitiva nisi passione praecedente in parte apprehensiva*). Therefore, the passions exist more in the apprehensive part than in the appetitive part.

#

Objection 2: What is more active seems to be less passive, since acting is opposed to being acted upon (*actio passioni opponitur*). But the appetitive part is more active than the apprehensive part. Therefore, it seems that the passions exist more in the apprehensive part.

#

Objection 3: Just as the sentient appetite is a power in a corporeal organ, so too is the sentient apprehensive power. But the passions of the soul come to exist, properly speaking, through a bodily change (secundum transmutationem corporalem). Therefore, it is not the case that they exist in the sentient appetitive part more than in the sentient apprehensive part.

#

But contrary to this: In De Civitate Dei 9 Augustine says, "The movements of our mind- in the Greek-are such that some, like Cicero, call them perturbations (perturbationes), and some call them affections (affectiones) or affects (affectus), while others call them-more clearly, as in the Greek-passions (passiones)." From this it is clear that the passions of the soul are the same as affections. But affections clearly belong to the appetitive part and not to the apprehensive part. Therefore, the passions are likewise in the appetitive part rather than in the apprehensive part.

#

I respond: As has already been explained (a. 1), the name 'passion' implies that the thing being acted upon (patiens) is drawn toward something that belongs to the agent. Now the soul is drawn toward a thing through its appetitive power rather than through its apprehensive power. For it is through its appetitive power that the soul is ordered toward the things themselves insofar as they exist in themselves (ad ipsas res prout in seipsis sunt). Hence, in Metaphysics 6 the Philosopher says that "the good and the bad"-i.e., the objects of the appetitive power-"exist in the

things themselves."

By contrast, the apprehensive power is not drawn to things insofar as they exist in themselves; rather, it has cognition of a thing in accord with the thing's intention (*secundum intentionem rei*), which it has or receives within itself in its own mode. Hence, in the same place the Philosopher says that "the true and the false"- which pertain to cognition-"exist in the mind and not in the things." Hence, it is clear that the character of a passion is found in the appetitive part more than in the apprehensive part.

#

Reply to objection 1: What pertains to perfection behaves in a way contrary to what pertains to defectiveness (*e contrario se habet in his quae pertinent ad perfectionem et in his quae pertinent ad defectum*).

In the case of what pertains to perfection, intensity is associated with an approach toward a single first principle (*attenditur per accessum ad unum primum principium*), so that the closer something is to that principle, the more intense it is. For instance, the intensity of light is associated with its approach toward something that is maximally bright, so that the closer it gets to that thing, the brighter it is. By contrast, in what pertains to defectiveness, intensity is associated not with an approach toward some highest thing, but instead with a movement away from the perfect, since this is what the character of privation and defectiveness consists in. And so the less remote a defect is from the first thing, the less intense it is; and, for this reason, at the beginning a defect is always small, and then later, as it proceeds further, it becomes greater (*postea procedendo magis*

multiplicatur). Now the passions have to do with defectiveness, since a passion belongs to something insofar as it is in potentiality. Hence, in things that are close to the first perfect thing, viz., God, there is hardly anything of the character of potentiality and passion, whereas in the other things that come after them, there is more potentiality and passion. And so it is likewise the case that there is less of the character of a passion in that prior power of the soul, viz., the apprehensive power.

#

Reply to objection 2: The appetitive power is said to be more active because it is more of a source (principium) for the exterior act. It has this feature from the very fact in virtue of which it is more passive, viz., that it has an ordering toward a thing insofar as that thing exists in itself. For it is through the exterior act that we arrive at the attainment of things.

#

Reply to objection 3: As was explained in the First Part (ST 1, q. 78, a. 3), there are two ways in which an organ of the soul can be changed: (a) by a spiritual change (transmutatione spirituali), insofar as it receives the intention of a thing (recipit intentionem rei). This sort of change exists per se in the act of the sentient apprehensive power; for instance, the eye is changed by the visible thing not in such a way that it becomes colored, but in such a way that it receives the intention of color. (b) by a separate natural change in the organ, insofar as the organ is changed with respect to its natural condition—e.g., becoming hot or cold or being

changed in some similar way. This sort of change is related per accidens to the act of the sentient apprehensive power-as, for instance, when the eye is fatigued by an intent gaze or weakened by the intensity of a visible thing. However, a change of this sort is ordered per se toward an act of the sentient appetite. This is why a natural change in an organ is posited materially in the definition of movements of the appetitive part-as, for instance, when it is said that anger is the heating of the blood around the heart. Hence, it is clear that the character of a passion is found more in the act of sentient appetitive power than in the act of the sentient apprehensive power, even though both are acts of a corporeal organ.

##

First of the Second Part, QUESTION 22, Article 3

Are the passions in the sentient appetite more than in the intellectual appetite?

It seems that the passions are not in the sentient appetite rather than in the intellectual appetite:

#

Objection 1: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 2, Dionysius says that Hierotheus "was taught by a more divine inspiration, not only learning divine things, but also undergoing them (non solum discens sed etiam patiens divina)." But the undergoing of divine things (*passio divinorum*) cannot belong to the sentient appetite, the object of which is the sensible good. Therefore, the passions exist in the intellectual appetite as well as in the sentient appetite.

#

Objection 2: The more powerful the agent (activum) is, the stronger the passion. But the intellective appetite's object, viz., the good in general (bonum universale), is a more powerful agent than the sentient appetite's object, viz., a particular good. Therefore, the character of being a passion is found more in the intellective appetite than in the sentient appetite.

#

Objection 3: Joy and love are said to be passions. But they are found in the intellectual appetite and not just in the sentient appetite; otherwise, they would not be attributed in the Scriptures to God and the angels. Therefore, it is not the case that the passions exist more in the sentient appetite than in the intellectual appetite.

#

But contrary to this: In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2 Damascene, in describing the animal passions, says, "A passion is a movement of the sentient appetitive power upon one's imagining something good or bad." And in another place: "A passion is a movement of the non-rational soul upon one's receiving an indication of something good or bad."

#

I respond: As has already been explained (a. 1), a passion properly speaking exists when there is a bodily change (*ubi est transmutatio corporalis*). Such a change is found in the acts of the sentient soul-and not only a spiritual change, as in the case of sentient apprehension, but a natural change as well. By contrast, in the case of an act of the intellectual appetite no bodily change is required, because this sort of appetite is not a power of any organ.

Hence, it is clear that the character of a passion is found more properly in an act of the sentient appetite than in an act of the intellectual appetite, and this is likewise clear from the definitions cited from Damascene.

#

Reply to objection 1: Here what is called an "undergoing of divine things" is (a) an affection directed toward divine things and (b) a union with those things through a love that occurs without a bodily change.

#

Reply to objection 2: The magnitude of a passion depends not only on the agent's power but also on the patient's susceptibility (*sed etiam ex passibilitate patientis*), since things that are highly susceptible (*bene passibilia*) are acted upon strongly even by puny agents (*etiam a parvis activis*). Therefore, even if the intellective appetite's object is more active than the sentient appetite's object, the sentient appetite is nonetheless more passive.

#

Reply to objection 3: When 'love', 'joy', and other names of this sort are attributed to God or the angels-or to men with respect to their intellective appetite-they signify a simple act of willing along with a likeness of the effect, but without any passion. Hence, in *De Civitate Dei* 9 Augustine says, "The holy angels punish without anger and give help without compassionate sadness. And yet-because of a certain likeness in the works and not because of the weakness of having affections-the names of those passions are by a custom of human speech applied to the angels as well."

##

First of the Second Part QUESTION 23

The Differences among the Passions

Next we have to consider the differences the passions have from one another. And on this topic there are four questions:

- (1) Are the passions that exist in the concupiscible power diverse from the ones that exist in the irascible power?
- (2) Is the contrariety among the passions of the irascible power based on the contrariety between the good and the bad?
- (3) Is there any passion that does not have a contrary?
- (4) Are there any passions within the same power that differ in species and are not contrary to one another?

##

First of the Second Part, QUESTION 23, Article 1

Do the same passions exist in the irascible and concupiscible powers?

It seems that the same passions exist in the irascible and concupiscible powers:

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Objection 1: In Ethics 2 the Philosopher says that the passions of the soul are "the ones that joy (gaudium) and sadness (tristitia) follow upon." But joy and sadness exist in the concupiscible power. Therefore, all the passions exist in the concupiscible power. Therefore, the passions that exist in the irascible power are not different from the ones that exist in the concupiscible power.

#

Objection 2: Jerome's Gloss on Matthew 13:33 ("The kingdom of heaven is like leaven") says, "In the power of reason we have prudence, in the irascible power we have hatred for the vices, and in the concupiscible power we have desire for the virtues." But as Topics 2 says, hatred (odium) exists in the concupiscible power, as does love (amor), which it is its contrary. Therefore, the same passions exist in the concupiscible and irascible powers.

#

Objection 3: Passions, as well as actions, differ in species from one another according to their objects. But the objects of the passions of the irascible power are the same as the objects of the passions of the concupiscible power. Therefore, the same passions belong to the irascible and concupiscible powers.

#

But contrary to this: The acts of diverse powers, e.g., seeing and hearing, are

diverse in species. But as was established in the First Part (ST 1, q. 81, a. 2), the irascible and the concupiscible are two powers that divide the sentient appetite. Therefore, since, as was explained above (q. 22, a. 3), the passions are movements of the sentient appetite, it follows that the passions that exist in the irascible power differ in species from the passions that exist in the concupiscible power.

#

I respond: The passions that exist in the irascible power and the passions that exist in the concupiscible power differ from one another in species. For since, as was explained in the First Part (q. 77, a. 3), diverse powers have diverse objects, it is necessary for the passions of diverse powers to be directed toward diverse objects. Hence, a fortiori, the passions of the diverse powers differ in species, since a greater difference in the objects is required for a diversity of species among powers than for a diversity of species among the passions or actions of those powers. For just as, among natural things, a diversity of genus follows upon a diversity in the potentiality of the matter, whereas a diversity of species follows upon a diversity of form in the same matter, so too, among the acts of the soul, acts belonging to diverse powers are diverse not only in species but also in genus, whereas the acts or passions that are directed toward diverse specific objects that fall under the common object of a single power differ as species of the same genus. Therefore, in order to discern which passions exist in the irascible power and which exist in the concupiscible power, one must take the object of each of these powers. Now in the First Part (ST 1, q. 81, a. 2) it was explained that the object of the concupiscible power is the sensible good or the sensible bad taken absolutely (*bonum vel malum sensibile simpliciter acceptum*), i.e., the

pleasurable (*delectabile*) or the painful (*dolorosum*). However, because it is necessary for the soul to suffer sometimes from difficulties and opposition in attaining a good of this sort or in avoiding something bad, and to the extent that attaining the good or avoiding the bad is in some sense elevated beyond the animal's easily exercised power (*quodammodo elevatum supra facilem potestatem animalis*), it follows that the object of the irascible power is the good or the bad insofar as it has the character of being arduous or difficult (*secundum quod habet rationem ardui vel difficilis*).

Therefore, if a passion is directed toward the good or the bad absolutely speaking e.g., joy (*gaudium*), sadness (*tristitia*), love (*amor*), hatred (*odium*) then it belongs to the concupiscible power. By contrast, if a passion is directed toward the good or the bad under the notion arduous, i.e., insofar as it is attainable or avoidable with some difficulty e.g., daring (*audacia*), fear (*timor*), hope (*spes*), etc. then it belongs to the irascible power.

#

Reply to objection 1: As was explained in the First Part (ST 1, q. 81, a. 2), the irascible power was given to animals in order that the obstacles might be removed by which the concupiscible power is prevented from tending toward its object either because of the difficulty involved in attaining a good or because of the difficulty involved in overcoming an evil. And this is why the irascible passions are all terminated in the concupiscible passions. Accordingly, joy and sadness, which exist in the concupiscible power, follow upon even those passions that exist in the irascible power.

#

Reply to objection 2: Jerome attributes the hatred of the vices to the irascible power not because of the character of hatred, which properly belongs to the concupiscible power, but rather because of the pugnacity (propter impugnationem) that belongs to the irascible power.

#

Reply to objection 3: It is the good insofar as it is pleasurable (bonum in quantum est delectabile) that moves the concupiscible power. But if a good is such that there is a difficulty involved in attaining it, then by that very fact the good in question has something that is contrary to the concupiscible power. And so it was necessary for there to be another power that would tend toward that good; and the same line of reasoning applies to bad things. The power in question is the irascible power. Hence, it is because of this that the passions of the concupiscible power differ in species from the passions of the irascible power.

##

First of the Second Part, QUESTION 23, Article 2

Is the contrariety among the passions of the irascible power based only on the contrariety between the good and the bad?

It seems that the contrariety among the passions of the irascible power (contrarietas passionum irascibilis) is based only on the contrariety between the good and the

bad:

#

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 1), the passions of the irascible power are ordered toward the passions of the concupiscible power. But the passions of the concupiscible power are not contrary to one another except according to the contrariety between the good and the bad, in the way that love is contrary to hatred and joy to sadness. Therefore, the passions of the irascible appetite are likewise not contrary to one another except according to the contrariety between the good and the bad.

#

Objection 2: The passions differ from one another according to their objects in the same way that movements differ from one another according to their termini. But as is clear from Physics 5, there is no contrariety among movements other than that based on the contrariety among their termini. But the object of an appetite is either the good or the bad. Therefore, there cannot be a contrariety among the passions in any appetitive power except one based on the contrariety between the good and the bad.

#

Objection 3: As Avicenna says in De Naturalibus 6, "Every passion of the soul involves approach and withdrawal (omnis passio animae attenditur secundum

accessum et recessum)." But approach is caused by the character of the good, whereas withdrawal is caused by the character of the bad, since just as the good "is what all things desire," as Ethics 1 puts it, so too the bad is what all things seek to avoid. Therefore, there cannot be a contrariety among the passions of the soul that is not based on the contrariety between the good and the bad.

#

But contrary to this: As is clear from Ethics 3, fear and daring are contrary to one another. But fear and daring do not differ with respect to the good and the bad, since both of them are directed at things that are bad. Therefore, not every contrariety among the passions of the irascible power is based on the contrariety between the good and the bad.

#

I respond: As Physics 3 says, a passion is a certain sort of movement. Hence, one has to interpret the contrariety among the passions in accord with the contrariety among movements or changes. Now as Physics 5 says, there are two sorts of contrariety among changes or movements:

(a) The first has to do with approach toward and withdrawal from the same terminus (*secundum accessum et recessum ab eodem termino*). This sort of contrariety belongs properly to changes (*mutationes*), i.e., to (a) generation, which is a change toward *esse*, and (b) corruption, which is a change away from *esse*.

(b) The second has to do with a contrariety among the termini. This sort of contrariety properly belongs to movements (*motus*) in the way that whitewashing (*dealbatio*), which is a movement from blackness to whiteness, is contrary to blackening (*denigratio*), which is a movement from whiteness to blackness. So, then, two sorts of contrariety are found among the passions of the soul (a) one involving a contrariety among their objects, viz., the good and the bad, and (b) the other involving approach toward and withdrawal from the same terminus.

Now among the passions of the concupiscible power one finds only the first sort of contrariety, viz., contrariety among the objects, whereas among the passions of the irascible power one finds both sorts of contrariety. The reason for this is that, as was explained above (a. 1), the object of the concupiscible power is the sensible good or the sensible bad absolutely speaking. Now the good as good cannot be a terminus from which (*terminus ut a quo*), but can only be a terminus toward which (*solum ut ad quem*), since nothing withdraws from the good insofar as it is good, but instead all things desire it. Similarly, nothing desires the bad insofar as it is bad, but instead all things withdraw from it; because of this, the bad has only

the character of a terminus from which and not the character of a terminus toward which.

So, then, every passion of the concupiscible power that has to do with the good viz., love (amor), desire (desiderium), and joy (gaudium) tends toward the good itself, whereas every passion of the concupiscible power that has to do with the bad viz., hatred(odium), withdrawal (fuga), and sadness (tristitia) tends away from the bad itself. Hence, among the passions of the concupiscible power there cannot be any contrariety based on approach toward and withdrawal from the same object. By contrast, as was explained above (a. 1), the object of the irascible power is not the sensible good or bad absolutely speaking, but rather the sensible good or bad as characterized by difficulty or arduousness (sub ratione difficultatis vel arduitatatis). Now the arduous or difficult good has (a) the character of being tended toward insofar as it is good, and this pertains to the passion of hope (spes), and (b) the character of being withdrawn from insofar as it is arduous or difficult, and this pertains to the passion of despair (desperatio). Similarly, the arduous bad has

(a) the character of being avoided insofar as it is bad, and this pertains to the passion of fear (timor), and it also has (b) the character of being tended toward as something arduous in order thereby to escape from being subjected to the bad, and it is daring (audacia) that tends toward it in this way. Thus, among the passions of the irascible power one finds (a) a contrariety according to the good and the bad, as in the case of the contrariety between hope and fear, and again (b) a contrariety according to approach toward and withdrawal from the same terminus, as in the case of the contrariety between daring and fear.

#

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

##

First of the Second Part, QUESTION 23, Article 3

Does every passion of the soul have a contrary?

It seems that every passion of the soul has a contrary (habeat aliquid contrarium):

#

Objection 1: As was explained above (a. 1), every passion of the soul exists either in the irascible power or in the concupiscible power. But both sorts of passions have contrariety in their own way. Therefore, every passion of the soul has a contrary.

#

Objection 2: Every passion of the soul has either the good or the bad as its object, and these are in general the objects of the appetitive part of the soul. But a passion whose object is the bad is contrary to a passion whose object is the good.

Therefore, every passion has a contrary.

#

Objection 3: As has been explained (a. 2), every passion of the soul involves either approach or withdrawal. But for every approach there is a contrary withdrawal (cuilibet accessui contrariatur recessus), and vice versa. Therefore, every passion of the soul has a contrary.

#

But contrary to this: Anger is a passion of the soul. But as is clear from Ethics 4, no passion is posited as the contrary of anger. Therefore, not every passion of the soul has a contrary.

#

I respond: It is peculiar to the passion of anger that it cannot have a contrary based either on approach and withdrawal or on the good and the bad.

For anger is caused by a difficult evil that is already occurring and in the presence of which the appetite must either

(a) succumb, in which case it does not go beyond the limits of sadness, which is a concupiscible passion, or else (b) experience a movement toward attacking the hurtful evil, and this pertains to anger. However, the appetite cannot experience a

movement toward withdrawal, since the evil is already assumed to be present or past. And so there is no passion that is contrary to the movement of anger according to a contrariety between approach and withdrawal. Again, there is likewise no passion that is contrary to the movement of anger according to a contrariety between the good and the bad. For what is contrary to an already occurring evil is an already acquired good, which no longer has the character of an arduous or difficult good. Nor does any other movement remain after the good is acquired except for the appetite's resting in the acquired good, and this pertains to joy, which is a concupiscible passion.

Hence, the movement of anger cannot have any contrary movement of the soul. Rather, the only thing contrary to it is a cessation of movement. As the Philosopher says in the Rhetoric, "Calming down is opposed to getting angry, but it is opposed to it not as its contrary, but instead as its negation or privation."

#

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

##

First of the Second Part, QUESTION 23, Article 4

Is it possible for passions that differ in species and are not contrary to one another to exist in the same power?

It seems that it is impossible for passions that differ in species and are not opposed to one another to exist in the same power:

#

Objection 1: The passions of the soul differ according to their objects. But the objects of the passions of the soul are the good and the bad, and it is according to the difference between them that the passions have contrariety. Therefore, no passions that belong to the same power and are not contrary to one another differ from one another in species.

#

Objection 2: A difference in species is a difference in form. But as *Metaphysics* 10 says, "Every difference in form is a difference in accord with some sort of contrariety." Therefore, passions that belong to the same power and are not contraries do not differ in species. Objection 3: Since every passion of the soul involves approach toward or withdrawal from the good or the bad, it seems necessary for every difference among the passions of the soul to be based either

(a) on the difference between the good and the bad or (b) on the difference between approach and withdrawal or (c) on a greater or lesser approach or withdrawal. But as has been explained (a. 2), the first two sorts of differences make for a contrariety among the passions of the soul. On the other hand, the third sort of difference does not make for diverse species, since if it did, then there would be infinitely many species of passions of the soul. Therefore, it is impossible for

passions belonging to the same power of the soul to differ in species and yet not be contraries.

#

But contrary to this: Love and joy differ in species and exist in the concupiscible power. And yet they are not contrary to one another in a way that prevents the one from being a cause of the other. Therefore, there are passions of the soul belonging to the same power that differ in species and yet are not contraries.

#

I respond: The passions differ in accord with the agents (activa) that are the objects of the passions of the soul. And there are two possible ways to think of the differences among the agents: (a) with respect to the species or natures of the agents themselves, and (b) with respect to their diverse active powers.

The diversity of agents or movers with respect to the power of effecting movement can be applied to the passions in accord with a likeness to natural agents. For everything that effects movement either draws the patient toward itself in some way or repels it away from itself. When it draws it toward itself, it effects three things in it. First, the agent gives the patient an inclination or aptitude to tend toward it, as when a lightweight body located in a high place (quod est sursum) gives to a generated body a lightness through which it has an inclination toward or aptitude for being in a high place. Second, if the generated body is located outside its proper place, the agent gives it movement toward that place (dat ei moveri ad locum). Third, the agent gives it rest when it arrives at that place, since something comes to rest in a place in virtue of the same cause by which it is moved to that place. And one should think along similar lines of a repelling cause (de causa repulsionis). Now in the movements of the appetitive part of the soul, the good has, as it were, the power to attract, whereas the bad has the power to repel.

Thus, first of all, the good causes in the appetitive power a certain inclination toward, or aptitude for, or connaturality with the good (causat quandam inclinationem seu aptitudinem seu connaturalitatem ad bonum). This pertains to the passion of love (amor); and corresponding to it, as its contrary on the side of the bad, is hatred (odium).

Second, if the good has not yet been attained, it gives the appetitive power a

movement toward acquiring the good that is loved, and this pertains to the passion of desire (desiderium) or sentient desire (concupiscentia). And contrary to this, on the part of the bad, is withdrawal (fuga) or aversion (abominatio).

Third, when the good has been attained, it gives the appetite a certain sort of rest (quaedam quietatio) in the good that has been attained, and this pertains to pleasure (delectatio) or joy (gaudium). And the opposite of this on the part of the bad is pain (dolor) or sadness (tristitia). Now in the case of the passions of the irascible power, what is presupposed is an aptitude for or inclination toward pursuing the good and withdrawing from the bad on the part of the concupiscible power, which has to do with the good and the bad absolutely speaking. With respect to a good that has not yet been attained, there is hope (spes) and despair (desperatio). With respect to something bad that has not yet occurred, there is fear (timor) and daring (audacia). With respect to a good that has already been attained, there is no passion in the irascible power, since, as was explained above (a. 3), such a good no longer has the character of something arduous. However, the passion of anger (ira) follows upon something bad that has already occurred. So, then, it is clear that in the concupiscible power there are three groups of passions, viz., (a) love and hatred, (b) desire and withdrawal, and (c) joy and sadness. Similarly, in the irascible power there are three groups, viz., (a) hope and despair, (b) fear and daring, and (c) anger, which has no passion opposed to it. Therefore, the passions that differ in species number eleven in all six in the concupiscible power and five in the irascible power. All the passions of the soul are contained under these. Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: This makes clear the responses to the objections.

T06: LOVE: First of the Second Part, QUESTIONS 26, 27, and 28

We are still reading from Saint Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae, Translated by Alfred J. Freddoso, University of Notre Dame

##

First of the Second Part, QUESTION 26

Next we have to consider the passions of the soul individually, first the passions of the concupiscible power (questions 26-39) and, second, the passions of the irascible power (questions 40-48).

The first consideration will have three parts. For, first, we will consider love (amor) and hatred (odium) (questions 26-29); second, sentient desire (concupiscentia) and withdrawal (fuga) (question 30); and, third, pleasure (delectatio) and pain or sadness (dolor vel tristitia) (questions 31-39).

As regards love, there are three things to consider: first, love itself (question 26); second, the causes of love (question 27); and third, the effects of love (question 28).

On the first topic there are four questions:

- (1) Does love exist in the concupiscible power?
- (2) Is love a passion?
- (3) Is love (amor) the same as elective love (dilectio)?
- (4) Is love appropriately divided into love of friendship (amor amicitiae) and love of concupiscence (amor concupiscentiae)?

##

First of the Second Part, QUESTION 26, Article 1

Does love exist in the concupiscible power?

It seems that love does not exist in the concupiscible power:

#

Objection 1: Wisdom 8:2 says, "Her,"-viz., Wisdom-"have I loved, and I have sought her out from my youth." But since the concupiscible power is part of the sentient appetite, it cannot tend toward Wisdom, which is not comprehended by the sensory power. Therefore, love does not exist in the concupiscible power.

#

Objection 2: Love seems to be identical with every passion; for in De Civitate Dei 14, Augustine says, "Love that longs to have what is loved is avid desire (cupiditas), while love that has and enjoys what is loved is delight (laetitia); love

that flees from what is contrary to what is loved is fear (timor); and love that feels what is contrary to what is loved is sadness (tristitia)." But not every passion exists in the concupiscible power; instead, fear, which has just been enumerated here, exists in the irascible power. Therefore, one should not claim without qualification that love exists in the concupiscible power.

#

Objection 3: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius posits a certain sort of "natural" love. But natural love seems rather to pertain to the natural powers, which belong to the vegetative part of the soul. Therefore, love does not unqualifiedly exist in the concupiscible power.

#

But contrary to this: In *Topics 2* the Philosopher says, "Love exists in the concupiscible power."

#

I respond: Love is something that involves the appetite (*amor est aliquid ad appetitum pertinens*), since the good is the object of both of them. Hence, the distinction among the types of love follows the distinction among the types of appetite. For instance, there is a certain type of appetite that follows another's apprehension and not the apprehension of the very thing that has the appetite; and an appetite of this sort is called a natural appetite. For as was explained in the

First Part (ST 1, q. 103, a. 1), natural things have an appetite for what is appropriate for them according to their nature, and yet they have this appetite not because of their own apprehension, but because of the apprehension of the One who establishes their nature. There is another type of appetite that follows the apprehension of the very thing that has the appetite, but it follows that apprehension by necessity and not by a free judgment (*ex necessitate, non ex iudicio libero*). This is the type of appetite that exists in brute animals, and yet in men this type of appetite has some participation in freedom to the extent that it obeys reason. On the other hand, there is another type of appetite that follows the apprehension of the one who has the appetite in accord with free choice (*secundum liberum arbitrium*). And this type of appetite is a rational or intellectual appetite, which is called the will.

Now in each of these types of appetite, what is called 'love' is the principle of the movement that tends toward the end that is loved. In a natural appetite, the principle of this sort of movement is the connaturality between the thing that has the appetite and the thing toward which it tends; and this is called natural love. For instance, the very connaturality of a heavy body with a place at the center is due to gravity, and it can be called 'natural love'. Similarly, the bond (*coaptatio*) between the sentient appetite or the will and some good-i.e., its being pleased with the good (*ipsa complacentia boni*)-is called 'sentient love' or 'intellective (or rational) love'. Thus, in the same way that intellective love exists in the intellectual appetite, sentient love exists in the sentient appetite. And this sentient love belongs to the concupiscible power, since 'love' is predicated with respect to the good absolutely speaking and not with respect to the arduous good, which is the object of the irascible power.

#

Reply to objection 1: This passage is talking about intellectual or rational love.

#

Reply to objection 2: It not by its essence but because of what it causes (non essentialiter sed causaliter) that love is said to be fear, joy, desire, and sadness.

#

Reply to objection 3: Natural love exists not only in the powers of the vegetative soul but in all the powers of the soul, as well as in all the parts of the body and, in general, in all things. For as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, "The beautiful and the good are lovable to everything," since each entity has a connaturality with what is appropriate to it, given its nature.

##

First of the Second Part, QUESTION 26, Article 2

Is love a passion?

It seems that love is not a passion:

#

Objection 1: No virtue (virtus) is a passion. But as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, every type of love is "a certain sort of virtue." Therefore, love is not a passion.

#

Objection 2: According to Augustine in *De Trinitate*, love is a certain sort of union or connection (unio quaedam vel nexus). But a union or connection is not a passion; instead, it is a relation. Therefore, love is not a passion.

#

Objection 3: In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2 Damascene says that a passion is "a certain sort of movement." But 'love' implies not a movement of the appetite, which is desire (desiderium), but a principle of such a movement. Therefore, love is not a passion.

#

But contrary to this: In Ethics 7 the Philosopher says, "Love is a passion."

#

I respond: A passion is an agent's effect within the patient. But a natural agent brings about two types of effect in the patient. For, first of all, it gives a form and, second, it gives the movement that follows upon that form. For instance, that which generates a body gives the body (a) heaviness (*gravitas*) and (b) the movement that follows upon heaviness. And it is the heaviness itself, which is a principle of the movement toward the place that is connatural to the body because of its heaviness, that can in a certain sense be called a natural love. So, too, the desirable thing itself (*ipsum appetibile*) gives to the appetite, first of all, a certain bond with it (*dat quendam coaptationem ad ipsum*), which is the appetite's being pleased with the desirable thing (*complacentia appetibilis*), and from this there follows a movement toward the desirable thing. For as Ethics 3 says, "The appetitive movement goes in a circle." The desirable thing moves the appetite and fashions itself in some way in the appetite's tendency (*faciens se quodammodo in eius intentione*), and the appetite tends toward attaining the desirable thing in reality, so that the movement ends where it began (*ut sit ibi finis motus ubi fuit principium*). Thus, the first change effected in the appetite by the desirable thing is called love, which is nothing other than the appetite's being pleased with the desirable thing; and from its being pleased there follows a movement toward the desirable thing, and this movement is desire; and, finally, there is rest, i.e., joy. So, then, since love consists in a certain change in the appetite effected by the desirable thing, it is clear that (a) love is a passion, properly speaking, insofar as it

exists in the concupiscible power, and that (b) love is a passion, in a general and extended sense, insofar as it exists in the will.

#

Reply to objection 1: Since 'virtue' signifies a principle of movement or of action, Dionysius is calling love 'a virtue' insofar as it is the principle of an appetitive movement.

#

Reply to objection 2: Union is relevant to love insofar as, through its being pleased (per complacentiam), the loving appetite is related to what it loves in the way it is related to itself or to something that belongs to it. And so it is clear that love is not the very relation of union; rather, the union follows upon the love. Hence, Dionysius says that love is "a unitive power," and in Politics 2 the Philosopher says that the union is the work of love (unio est opus amoris).

#

Reply to objection 3: Even though 'love' does not name the movement of an appetite that is tending toward a desirable thing, it nonetheless does name the movement of the appetite through which the appetite is changed by the desirable thing in order that the desirable thing might be pleasing to it.

##

First of the Second Part, QUESTION 26, Article 3

Is love (amor) the same as elective love (dilectio)?

It seems that love (amor) is the same as elective love (dilectio):

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Objection 1: In De Divinis Nominibus, chap. 4, Dionysius says that love and

elective love are related in the same way that "four and two times two are, and rectilinear figure and figure having straight lines are." But these signify the same thing. Therefore, 'love' (amor) and 'elective love' (dilectio) signify the same thing.

#

Objection 2: Appetitive movements differ from one another because of their objects. But the object of elective love is the same as the object of love. Therefore, they are the same.

#

Objection 3: If elective love and love differ in anything, they seem to differ in the fact that "'elective love' (dilectio) is used in the case of good things and 'love' (amor) is used in the case of bad things, according to some," as Augustine reports in De Civitate Dei 14. But they do not differ in this; for as Augustine points out in the same place, in Sacred Scripture both terms are used in the case of good things and in the case of bad things. Therefore, love and elective love do not differ from one another-and Augustine himself concludes in the same place that "It is not one thing to say 'love' (amor) and something else to say 'elective love' (dilectio)."

#

But contrary to this: In De Divinis Nominibus, chap. 4, Dionysius says, "It has seemed to some of the saints that the name 'love' (amor) is more divine than the name 'elective love' (dilectio).

#

I respond: There are four names that in one way or another point to the same thing (ad idem quodammodo pertinentia): 'love' (amor), 'elective love' (dilectio), 'charity' (caritas), and 'friendship' (amicitia). They differ from one another as follows: Friendship (amicitia), according to the Philosopher in Ethics 7, is a sort of habit, whereas love (amor) and elective love (dilectio) are signified in the manner of an act or a passion, and charity (caritas) can be taken in either of these two ways. However, the acts are signified differently by these last three names. For love is common to the three of them, since every act of elective love or act of charity is an act of love, but not vice versa. More specifically, 'elective love' adds to 'love' a previous act of choosing, just as the name itself suggests (dilectio/electio). Hence, elective love exists only in the will and not in the concupiscible power, and it exists only in a rational nature. On the other hand, 'charity' (caritas) adds to love a certain perfection of love (addit supra amorem perfectionem quandam amoris), insofar as that which is loved is thought of as having great worth (id quod amatur magni pretii aestimatur), as the name itself (carus/caritas) suggests.

#

Reply to objection 1: Dionysius is talking about love and elective love insofar as they exist in the intellective appetite, since in that case love and elective love are the same thing.

#

Reply to objection 2: The object of love (amor) is more general than the object of elective love (dilectio), since, as has been explained, love extends to more things than elective love does.

#

Reply to objection 3: Love and elective love are not differentiated by the differences good and bad, but are instead differentiated in the way that has been explained. And yet in the intellective part of the soul, love and elective love are the same thing. And it is in this sense that Augustine is talking about love (de amore) in the passage in question. That is why he adds a little later, "An upright act of will is a good act of love, and a perverse act of will is a bad act of love." Yet those who assigned the differences good and bad had a plausible reason for doing so (habuerunt occasionem), because the love that is a passion of the concupiscible power inclines many individuals toward what is bad.

#

Reply to the argument for the contrary: Some have claimed that even in the case of the will itself, the name 'love' (amor) is more divine than the name 'elective love' (dilectio). The reason is that 'love' implies a certain passivity (passio), mainly because love exists in the sentient appetite, whereas elective love (dilectio) presupposes the judgment of reason. But a man is better able to tend toward God through love (per amorem), having been attracted passively in a certain way by

God Himself, than he is able to be led to this by his own reason-which, as has been explained, is what is involved in the nature of elective love. And in this sense love (amor) is more divine than elective love (dilectio).

##

First of the Second Part, QUESTION 26, Article 4

Is love appropriately divided into love of friendship and love of concupiscence?

It seems that love is not appropriately divided into love of friendship (amor amicitiae) and love of concupiscence (amor concupiscentiae):

#

Objection 1: Love (amor) is a passion, whereas friendship (amicitiae) is a habit, as the Philosopher says in Ethics 8. But a habit cannot be a partition dividing a passion (pars divisa passionis). Therefore, love is not appropriately divided into love of concupiscence and love of friendship.

#

Objection 2: Nothing is divided by what is enumerated on the same level with it; for instance, man is not enumerated on the same level with animal. But concupiscence is enumerated on the same level with love as another passion that is distinct from love. Therefore, love is not divided by concupiscence.

#

Objection 3: According to the Philosopher in Ethics 8, there are three types of friendship: (a) friendship of utility, (b) friendship of pleasure, and (c) noble friendship (*amicitia utilis, delectabilis et honesta*). But friendship of utility and friendship of pleasure both involve concupiscence. Therefore, concupiscence should not be used to divide friendship.

#

But contrary to this: Some things we are said to love because we desire them; for instance, as Topics 2 points out, "someone is said to love wine because of the sweetness he desires in it." But as Ethics 8 says, we do not have friendship with wine or other things of that sort. Therefore, love of concupiscence is one thing and love of friendship is something else.

#

I respond: As the Philosopher says in Rhetoric 2, "To love is to will a good for someone." Therefore, the movement of love tends toward two things: (a) the good which one wills for someone, either for himself or for another (*in bonum quod*

quis vult alicui, vel sibi vel alii); and (b) the one he wills the good for (illud cui vult bonum). Thus, love of concupiscence is had with respect to that good which someone wills for another, and love of friendship is had with respect to the one that someone wills a good for. Hence, this distinction is a distinction between what is prior and what is posterior. For what is loved by a love of friendship is loved absolutely speaking and per se, whereas what is loved by a love of concupiscence is not loved absolutely speaking and in its own right (secundum se), but is instead loved for the sake of another. For just as a being absolutely speaking (ens simpliciter) is that which has esse, whereas a being in a certain respect (ens secundum quid) is something that exists in another, so too good, which is convertible with being, is such that what is good absolutely speaking is that which itself has goodness, whereas what is good in a certain respect (bonum secundum quid) is that which is the good of another. As a result, a love by which something is loved in order that there be some good for it is loved absolutely speaking, whereas a love by which something is loved in order that it be the good of another is loved in a certain respect.

#

Reply to objection 1: Love is divided not by friendship and concupiscence, but by love of friendship and love of concupiscence. For the one who is properly called a friend is he for whom we will some good, whereas we are said to desire (concupiscere) what we will for ourselves.

#

Reply to objection 2: This makes clear the reply to the second objection.

#

Reply to objection 3: In friendship of utility and friendship of pleasure, someone wills some good for his friend, and to that extent the nature of friendship is preserved in these cases. However, since the good in question is directed further toward pleasure or usefulness for oneself, it follows that to the extent that friendship of utility or friendship of pleasure is drawn closer to the love of concupiscence, it falls short of the nature of genuine friendship.

T07: The Causes of Love: First of the Second Part, Question 27

We are still reading from Saint Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae, Translated by Alfred J. Freddoso, University of Notre Dame

##

First of the Second Part, QUESTION 27

Next we have to consider the causes of love. And on this topic there are four questions:

- (1) Is the good the only cause of love?
- (2) Is cognition a cause of love?
- (3) Is likeness a cause of love?
- (4) Are any other passions of the soul causes of love?

##

First of the Second Part, QUESTION 27, Article 1

Is the good the only cause of love?

It seems that the good is not the only cause of love:

#

Objection 1: The good is a cause of love only because it is loved. But it happens that the bad is loved as well-this according to Psalm 10:6 ("He who loves iniquity hates his own soul"). Otherwise, every instance of love would be good.

Therefore, the good is not the only cause of love.

#

Objection 2: In Rhetoric 2 the Philosopher says, "We love those who acknowledge their own bad deeds." Therefore, it seems that the bad is a cause of love.

#

Objection 3: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that not only the good, but also "the beautiful is lovable to all things.-

#

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 8 Augustine says, "Surely, nothing is loved except the good." Therefore, only the good is a cause of love.

#

I respond: As was explained above (q. 26, a. 1), love belongs to the appetitive power, which is a passive power (*vis passiva*). Hence, its object is related to it as a cause of its movement or act. Therefore, the object of love must be a cause, properly speaking, of the love. But the proper object of love is the good, since, as has been explained (q. 26, aa. 1-2), love implies the lover's connaturality with, or his being pleased with, what is loved (*amor importat quendam connaturalitatem vel complacentiam amantis ad amatum*). But the good for each thing is what is connatural to it and proportioned to it. Hence, it follows that the good is a proper cause of love.

#

Reply to objection 1: The bad is never loved except under some notion of goodness-more specifically, insofar as it is good in some respect and is apprehended as good absolutely speaking (*in quantum est secundum quid bonum et apprehenditur ut simpliciter bonum*). So an instance of love is bad insofar as it tends toward something that is not a genuine good absolutely speaking. And a man "loves iniquity" in the sense that through iniquity he acquires some good, e.g., pleasure or money or something else of this sort.

#

Reply to objection 2: Those who "acknowledge their own bad deeds" are loved not because of the bad deeds, but because they acknowledge the bad deeds. For acknowledging one's own bad deeds has the character of something good, insofar as it does away with dissimulation or pretense (in quantum excludit fictionem seu simulationem).

#

Reply to objection 3: The beautiful is the same as the good and differs from it only in concept (sola ratione). For since the good is what all things desire, it is part of the notion of the good that the appetite comes to rest in it, whereas it is part of the notion of the beautiful that the appetite comes to rest in seeing it or knowing it. Hence, the senses that are principally directed toward the beautiful are those that are especially cognitive, viz., seeing and hearing at the service of reason. For we talk of beautiful sights and beautiful sounds. By contrast, in the case of the sensible objects of the other senses, we do not use the name 'beauty'. For instance, we do not call tastes and odors 'beautiful'. So it is clear that beautiful adds to good a certain ordering toward the cognitive power, so that the good is that which pleases the appetite absolutely speaking, whereas the beautiful is such that the apprehension of it is itself pleasing.

##

First of the Second Part, QUESTION 27, Article 2

Is cognition a cause of love?

It seems that cognition is not a cause of love:

#

Objection 1: The fact that something is sought after stems from love. But some things that are sought after are unknown, e.g., the sciences. For since, in the case of the sciences, "having them is the same as knowing them," as Augustine says in 83 Quaestiones, it follows that if they were known, they would be had and would not be sought after. Therefore, cognition is not a cause of love.

#

Objection 2: Something's being loved without being known seems to be the same sort of thing as something's being loved more than it is known. But some things are loved more than they are known-e.g., God, who in this life can be loved in Himself but cannot be known in Himself. Therefore, cognition is not a cause of love.

#

Objection 3: If cognition were a cause of love, then love could not exist where there is no cognition. But love exists in all things, as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, whereas cognition does not exist in all things. Therefore, cognition is not a cause of love.

#

But contrary to this: In De Trinitate 10 Augustine says, "No one can love anything that is unknown."

#

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), the good is a cause of love in the manner of an object. But the good is not the object of an appetite except insofar as it is apprehended. And so love requires some sort of apprehension of the good that is loved. Because of this, the Philosopher says in Ethics 9 that the corporeal act of seeing is a principle of sentient love. And, similarly, the spiritual contemplation of beauty or goodness is a principle of spiritual love. So, then, cognition is a cause of love for the same reason that the good is, viz., that the good cannot be loved unless there is a cognition of it.

#

Reply to objection 1: Someone who seeks after scientific knowledge is not altogether ignorant of it, but has some cognition of it beforehand, either in general, or in some of its effects, or through hearing it praised, as Augustine says in De Trinitate 10. So what is the same as having scientific knowledge is not having some cognition of scientific knowledge, but rather having a perfect cognition of scientific knowledge.

#

Reply to objection 2: Something is required for perfection in the case of cognition that is not required for perfection in the case of love. For cognition involves reason, the role of which is to separate things that are conjoined in reality and to bring together, by comparing one to another, things that are diverse. And so for perfection in the case of cognition it is required that a man know individually whatever exists in a thing, e.g., its parts, powers, and properties. By contrast, love exists in the appetitive power, which is directed toward a thing as it exists in itself. Hence, for perfection in the case of love it is sufficient that a thing be loved insofar as it is apprehended in itself. Thus, the reason why it is possible for a thing to be loved more than it is known is that it can be loved perfectly even if it is not known perfectly. This is especially clear in the case of the sciences, which some individuals love because of the summary cognition they have of them; for instance, they know that rhetoric is a science through which a man can give persuasive arguments, and they love this feature in rhetoric. And something similar should be said about loving God.

#

Reply to objection 3: Even natural love, which exists in all things, is caused by some sort of cognition-not, to be sure, by a cognition that exists in the natural things themselves, but rather, as was explained above (q. 26, a.1), by a cognition that exists in the One who institutes their nature.

##

First of the Second Part, QUESTION 27, Article 3

Is likeness a cause of love?

It seems that likeness (similitudo) is not a cause of love:

#

Objection 1: The same thing is not a cause of opposites. But likeness is a cause of hatred; for Proverbs 13:10 says, "Among the proud there are always contentions," and in Ethics 8 the Philosopher says, "Potters quarrel with each other." Therefore, likeness is not a cause of love.

#

Objection 2: In Confessiones 4 Augustine says, "One loves in another what he does not want to be; for instance, a man loves an actor and yet does not want to be an actor." But this would not be so if likeness were a proper cause of love; for in that case a man would love in another what he himself has or wants to have. Therefore, likeness is not a cause of love.

#

Objection 3: Each man loves what he himself needs, even if he does not have it; for instance, a sick man loves health and a poor man loves riches. But insofar as he both lacks and needs these things, he is unlike them. Therefore, it is not only likeness but also unlikeness that is a cause of love.

#

Objection 4: In Rhetoric 2 the Philosopher says, "We love those who give us money and health, and, similarly, everyone loves those who retain their friendship for the dead." But not everyone is like that. Therefore, likeness is not a cause of love.

#

But contrary to this: Ecclesiasticus 13:19 says, "Every animal loves its like."

#

I respond: Likeness is, properly speaking, a cause of love. But notice that there are two ways in which a likeness among things can be thought of: (a) insofar as both have the same feature in actuality, in the way that two individuals that have whiteness are said to be like one another; and (b) insofar as the one has in potentiality and by some sort of inclination what the other one has in actuality, as when we say that a heavy body located outside its proper place is like a heavy body that is located in its proper place—or even insofar as a potentiality bears a likeness to the corresponding actuality, since the actuality in some sense exists

within the potentiality itself. The first type of likeness is a cause of the love of friendship or benevolence (*causat amorem amicitiae seu benevolentiae*). For from the fact that two individuals are like one another and have, as it were, one form, they are in some sense united in that form (*sunt quodammodo unum in forma illa*), in the way that two men are united in the species human nature and in the way that two white individuals are united in whiteness. And so the affections of the one tend toward the other as toward something that is one with himself, and he wills the good for the other just as he wills it for himself.

By contrast, the second type of likeness is a cause of the love of concupiscence, or a cause of a friendship of utility or of pleasure (*causat amorem concupiscentiae vel amicitiam utilis seu delectabilis*). For each thing that exists in potentiality has as such a desire for its own actuality, and, if it is something with sentience and cognition, then it delights in attaining that actuality. Now it was explained above (q. 26, a. 4) that in a love of concupiscence the lover properly loves himself, since he wills the good that he desires. But each individual loves himself more than he loves another, since he is united with himself in his substance, whereas he is united to the other in a likeness of the same form. And so if he himself is impeded from attaining the good that he loves by the fact that there is someone else who is like him by participation in a form, then that individual becomes hateful to him, not insofar as he is like him, but insofar as the other poses an obstacle to his own good. And the reason why "potters quarrel with one another" is that each one poses an obstacle to the other's own profit; and the reason why "among the proud there are contentions" is that each keeps the other from attaining the excellence that he desires for himself (*se invicem impediunt in propria excellentia quam concupiscunt*).

#

Reply to objection 1: This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

#

Reply to objection 2: Even in the fact that someone loves in another what he does not love in himself one finds the character of a likeness by proportionality. For the individual is related to what he loves in himself in the same way that the other individual is related to what is loved in him. For instance, if a good singer loves a good writer, there is a likeness of proportion insofar as each of them has what is appropriate for him in accord with his own art.

#

Reply to objection 3: As has been explained, someone who loves what he needs bears a likeness to what he loves in the way that potentiality bears a likeness to actuality.

#

Reply to objection 4: In accord with this same sort of likeness that potentiality bears to actuality, someone who is not generous (non liberalis) loves someone who is generous insofar as he expects from him what he desires. And the same

line of reasoning holds for the case of an individual who perseveres in his friendship toward someone who does not persevere in friendship toward him. In both cases, there seems to be a friendship of utility. An alternative reply is that even though not all men have virtues of the relevant sort by a perfect habit, they nonetheless have certain seeds of reason in accord with which someone who lacks virtue loves a virtuous individual insofar as the latter conforms to his own natural reason.

##

First of the Second Part, QUESTION 27, Article 4

Can any of the other passions be a cause of love?

It seems that some of the other passions can be a cause of love:

#

Objection 1: In Ethics 8 the Philosopher says that some individuals are loved for the sake of pleasure. But pleasure (delectatio) is a passion. Therefore, there is some other passion that is a cause of love.

#

Objection 2: Desire (desiderium) is a passion. But we love some individuals out of a desire for what we expect from them, as is obvious in every friendship that

exists for the sake of utility. Therefore, there is some other passion that is a cause of love.

#

Objection 3: In De Trinitate 10 Augustine says, "If someone has no hope of getting a thing, he either loves it tepidly or does not love it at all, even though he sees how beautiful it is." Therefore, hope is likewise a cause of love.

#

But contrary to this: As Augustine says in De Civitate Dei 14, all the other affections of the soul are caused by love.

#

I respond: There is no other passion of the soul that does not presuppose some instance of love. The reason for this that every other passion of the soul involves either a movement toward something or resting in something. But every movement toward something or instance of resting in something proceeds from some sort of connaturality or bond (ex aliqua connaturalitate vel coaptationem procedit), and this belongs to the nature of love. Hence, it is impossible for any other passion of the soul to be a cause in general of every instance of love.

However, it does happen that some other passion is a cause of some instance of love, just as one good is likewise a cause of another good.

#

Reply to objection 1: When someone loves something for the sake of pleasure, the love is, to be sure, caused by pleasure, but that pleasure is, once again, caused by another previous instance of love. For no one takes pleasure except in a thing that is in some way loved.

#

Reply to objection 2: The desire for a thing always presupposes love for that thing. But the desire for a thing can be a cause of another thing's being loved. For instance, someone who desires money loves for this reason the one from whom he receives money.

#

Reply to objection 3: Hope causes and increases love, both (a) by reason of pleasure, since hope is a cause of pleasure, and (b) by reason of desire, since hope fortifies desire, since we do not desire as intensely what we do not hope for. And yet the hope is itself a hope for some good that is loved.

We are still reading from Saint Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae, Translated by Alfred J. Freddoso, University of Notre Dame

##

Next we have to consider the effects of love. And on this topic there are six questions:

- (1) Is union (unio) an effect of love?
- (2) Is mutual indwelling (mutua inhaesio) an effect of love?
- (3) Is ecstasy (extasis) an effect of love?
- (4) Is jealousy (zelus) an effect of love?
- (5) Is love a passion that is hurtful (passio laesiva) to the lover?
- (6) Is love a cause of everything that a lover does?

##

First of the Second Part, QUESTION 28, Article 1

Is union an effect of love?

It seems that union (unio) is not an effect of love:

#

Objection 1: Absence is incompatible with union. But love is compatible with

absence; for in Galatians 4:18 the Apostle says, "Always emulate the good in one who is good" (speaking of himself, as a Gloss says), "and not only when I am present among you." Therefore, union is not an effect of love.

#

Objection 2: Union exists either (a) through the essence, in the way that form is united with matter, and an accident with its subject, and a part either with its whole or with another part to constitute a whole, or (b) through a likeness of either genus or species or accident. But love does not cause a union of essence; otherwise, love would never be had with respect to things that are divided by their essence. And love does not cause the sort of union that exists through likeness; instead, it itself is caused by such a union, as has been explained (q. 27, a. 3). Therefore, union is not an effect of love.

#

Objection 3: The sensory power in acting (in actu) becomes in actuality (in actu) the thing sensed, and the intellect in acting becomes in actuality the thing understood. But the one who is exercising an act of love (amans in actu) does not become in actuality the thing loved. Therefore, union is more an effect of cognition than it is of love.

#

But contrary to this: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that every instance of love is "a unitive power."

#

I respond: A lover has two sorts of union with what is loved: (a) The one is a real union (secundum rem), viz., when the thing loved is now present to the lover. (b) The other is an affective union (secundum affectum), and this union has to be thought of as proceeding from a previous apprehension, since an appetitive movement follows upon an apprehension. Now since there are two types of love, viz., love of concupiscence and love of friendship, both proceed from an apprehension of the unity of the thing loved with the lover. For when someone loves something in the sense of desiring it (quasi concupiscens illud), he apprehends it as relevant to his own well-being (quasi pertinens ad suum bene esse). Similarly, when he loves someone with a love of friendship, he wills the good for him in the same way that he wills the good for himself; hence, he apprehends him as another self (apprehendit eum ut alterum se) insofar as he wills the good for him in the same way that he wills the good for himself. Thus it is

that a friend is said to be another self (*amicus dicitur esse alter ipse*), and in *Confessiones* 4 Augustine says, "Someone fittingly called his friend half of his soul." Therefore, love brings about the first type of union as an efficient cause (effective), since it effects a movement toward desiring and seeking the presence of the thing that is loved as something that is fitting for and relevant to oneself. However, it brings about the second type as a formal cause (*formaliter*), since love itself is just this sort of union or connection. Hence, in *De Trinitate* 8 Augustine says that love is like "a life that connects, or seeks to connect, two things, viz., the lover and what is loved." When he says 'connects', this refers to the affective union (*refertur ad unionem affectus*), without which there is no love, whereas when he says 'seeks to connect', this has to do with the real union.

#

Reply to objection 1: This objection goes through for the case of a real union. Pleasure requires real union as its cause, whereas desire exists in the real absence of what is loved, and love exists both in the absence of what is loved and in its presence.

#

Reply to objection 2: There are three ways in which an instance of union may be related to love:

(a) An instance of union may be a cause of love. This is a substantial union in the case of the love by which someone loves himself, while, as has been explained (q.

27, a. 3), it is a union of likeness in the case of the love by which someone loves other things. (b) An instance of union may be essentially the love itself, and this is union by a bond of affection (*secundum adaptationem affectus*). This sort of union is assimilated to a substantial union in a case in which the lover is related to what is loved either in a love of friendship with respect to himself or in a love of concupiscence with respect to something of his own. (c) An instance of union may be an effect of love. This is a real union that the lover seeks after with respect to what is loved. And this sort of union is appropriate for love (*est secundum convenientiam amoris*). For as the Philosopher reports in *Politics 2*, "Aristophanes claimed that lovers would desire to be united by the two becoming one," but since "this would result in one or both of them being destroyed," they seek a union that is appropriate and fitting, viz., to live together and converse together and to be joined in other such ways.

#

Reply to objection 3: Cognition is perfected by the fact that the thing known is united to the knower by a likeness. By contrast, as has been explained, love brings it about that the very thing that is loved is united in some way to the lover. This is why love is more unitive than cognition is.

##

First of the Second Part, QUESTION 28, Article 2

Is love a cause of mutual indwelling in the sense that the lover exists in what is loved and vice versa?

It seems that love is not a cause of mutual indwelling (*mutua inhaesio*) in the sense that the lover exists in what is loved, and vice versa:

#

Objection 1: What exists in another is contained in that other. But the same thing cannot be both the container and the contained. Therefore, love cannot be a cause of mutual indwelling in the sense that what is loved exists in the lover, and vice versa.

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Objection 2: Nothing can penetrate into the interior of any whole except through some sort of division. But to divide what is joined in reality pertains to reason and not to the appetite, in which love exists. Therefore, mutual indwelling is not an effect of love.

#

Objection 3: If through love the lover exists in what is loved and vice versa, then it will follow that what is loved is united to the lover in the same way that the lover is united to what is loved. But as has been explained (a. 1), the union itself is the

love. Therefore, it follows that the lover is always loved by what is loved, which is clearly false. Therefore, it is not the case that mutual indwelling is an effect of love.

#

But contrary to this: 1 John 4:16 says, "He who abides in charity abides in God, and God in him." But charity (caritas) is the love of God (amor Dei). Therefore, for the same reason, every instance of love brings it about that what is loved exists in the lover, and vice versa.

#

I respond: This effect of mutual indwelling can be thought of both a) with respect to the apprehensive power and
(b) with respect to the appetitive power: As regards the apprehensive power, what is loved is said to exist in the lover insofar as what is loved lingers in the lover's apprehension this according to Philippians 1:7 ("..... because I have you in my heart"). On the other hand, the lover is said to exist by apprehension in what is loved insofar as the lover is not content with a superficial apprehension of what is loved, but instead tries to discover everything that belongs intrinsically to what is loved and so to enter into its depths (*ad interiora eius ingeditur*) just as 1 Corinthians 2:10 says of the Holy Spirit, who is the Love of God, that He "searches all things, even the deep things of God." As regards the appetitive power, what is loved is said to exist in the lover insofar as it exists in his affections

through his being pleased, so that either (a) he takes pleasure in it or in its good aspects when it is present or (b) in its absence he tends toward (i) what is loved itself through a love of concupiscence or (ii) toward the goods that he wills through a love of friendship for the one who is loved not because of any extrinsic cause, as when someone desires something for the sake of something else or when someone wills a good for another for the sake of something else, but because he is pleased with the one he loves in a way that is interiorly rooted. This is why love is called 'intimate' and why one uses the expression 'the bowels of charity'. Conversely, the lover exists in what is loved in one way through the love of concupiscence and in a different way through the love of friendship. For the love of concupiscence does not come to rest in any extrinsic or superficial attainment of or enjoyment of what is loved, but instead seeks to possess it perfectly reaching its insides, as it were (*quasi ad intima illius perveniens*). By contrast, in the love of friendship the lover exists in what is loved in the sense of treating his friend's goods or evils as his own, and his friend's will as his own, so that he himself seems to undergo the good and the bad in his friend, as it were, and to be affected by them. Because of this, according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 9 and *Rhetoric* 2, it is proper for friends "to will the same things and to sorrow over and rejoice in the same things." And so to the extent that he thinks of what belongs to his friend as his own, the lover seems to exist in the one who is loved and becomes, as it were, the same as the one who is loved. Conversely, to the extent that he wills and acts for the sake of his friend as for his own sake, thinking of his friend as if he were identical with himself, the one who is loved exists within the lover. There is also a third way in which mutual indwelling can be thought of in the love of friendship, by way of reciprocation, insofar as the friends mutually love one another and will and do good things for one another.

#

Reply to objection 1: What is loved is contained in the lover in the sense that it is impressed in his affections through his being pleased. Conversely, the lover is contained in what is loved in the sense that the lover pursues in some way that which is innermost (intima) in what is loved. For nothing prohibits a thing's being both container and contained in different senses, just as a genus is contained within its species and vice versa.

#

Reply to objection 2: Reason's apprehension precedes love's affection. And so, as is clear from what has been said, as reason investigates what is loved, love's affection enters into it.

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Reply to objection 3: This argument goes through for the third mode of indwelling, which is not found in every instance of love.

##

First of the Second Part, QUESTION 28, Article 3

Is ecstasy an effect of love?

It seems that ecstasy is not an effect of love:

#

Objection 1: Ecstasy seems to imply a sort of loss of self (extasis quendam alienationem importare videtur). But love does not always bring about loss of self, since lovers sometimes have self-mastery (amantes interdum sui compotes). Therefore, love does not bring about ecstasy.

#

Objection 2: A lover desires to be united to what is loved. Therefore, he draws the lover toward himself instead of entering into what is loved by going outside of himself (quam etiam pergat in amatum extra se exiens).

#

Objection 3: As has been explained (a. 1), love unites the lover to what is loved. Therefore, if the lover moves outside of himself in order to enter into what is loved, it follows that a lover always loves what is loved more than he loves himself. But this is clearly false. Therefore, it is not the case that ecstasy is an effect of love.

#

But contrary to this: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, "God's love brings about ecstasy, and God Himself undergoes ecstasy because of love." Therefore, since, as is explained in the same place, every instance of love is a sort of participated likeness in God's love, it seems that every instance of love is a

cause of ecstasy.

#

I respond: Someone is said to undergo ecstasy when he is put outside himself. This happens both (a) with respect to the apprehensive power and (b) with respect to the appetitive power. As regards the apprehensive power, someone is said to be put outside himself when he is put outside of the sort of cognition that is proper to him, either because

(a) he is elevated to a higher sort of cognition as a man, when he is elevated to comprehend things that lie beyond the senses and beyond reason, is said to undergo ecstasy in the sense of being put outside of the apprehension connatural to reason and the sensory power or because (b) he sinks down to a lower level, as someone is said to undergo ecstasy when he falls into furiousness or mindlessness (*cum aliquis in furiam vel amentiam cadit*). On the other hand, as regards the appetitive part of the soul, someone is said to undergo ecstasy when his desire for something carries him into the other and he in some sense goes outside himself. As has been explained (a. 1), love effects the first type of ecstasy as a disposing cause (dispositive), viz., by bringing it about that one thinks about what is loved, where such intense thinking about this one thing draws his thoughts away from other things. On the other hand, love effects the second type of ecstasy directly (*directe*). The love of friendship effects it absolutely speaking, whereas the love of concupiscence effects it in a certain respect and not absolutely speaking. For in the case of the love of concupiscence, the lover is carried outside of himself in the sense that, not content to rejoice over the good that he has, he seeks to enjoy something outside of himself. But because he seeks to have that

extrinsic good for himself, he does not go out of himself absolutely speaking; rather, this sort of affection ends up within himself after all. By contrast, in the case of the love of friendship, one's affection goes outside himself absolutely speaking, since he wills the good for his friend and, for the sake of the friend himself, exercises care for him and provides for him (*operatur quasi gerens curam et providentiam ipsius propter ipsum amicum*).

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Reply to objection 1: This argument goes through for the first type of ecstasy.

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Reply to objection 2: This argument goes through for the case of the love of concupiscence, which, as has been explained, does not bring about ecstasy absolutely speaking.

#

Reply to objection 3: To the extent that a lover goes outside of himself, he wills and does good things for his friend. However, he does not will his friend's good more than his own. Hence, it does not follow that he loves another more than he loves himself.

##

First of the Second Part, QUESTION 28, Article 4

Is jealousy an effect of love?

It seems that jealousy or zeal (zelus) is not an effect of love:

#

Objection 1: Jealousy is principle of contention; hence, 1 Corinthians 3:3 says, "There is among you jealousy and contention" But contention is incompatible with love. Therefore, jealousy is not an effect of love.

#

Objection 2: The object of love is the good, which communicates itself. But jealousy is incompatible with such communication, since it seems to be part of jealousy that an individual does not tolerate sharing what is loved (*non patiatur consortium in amato*). For instance, husbands are said to be jealous of their wives, because they do not want them to have familiarity with others (*quas nolunt habere communes cum ceteris*). Therefore, jealousy is not an effect of love.

#

Objection 3: Jealousy does not exist without hatred, just as it does not exist without love; for Psalm 72:3 says, "I was jealous of the wicked (*zelavi super iniquos*)."
Therefore, jealousy should not be called an effect of love more than an effect of hatred.

#

But contrary to this: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, "God is called a jealous lover (*zelotes*) because of the great love He has for the things that exist."

#

I respond: Jealousy (*zelus*), however it is understood, proceeds from love's intensity. For it is clear that the more intensely a power tends toward something,

the more forcefully it repels anything that is contrary or counteractive. Therefore, since, as Augustine says in 83 Quaestiones, "Love is a certain movement toward what is loved," an intense love seeks to exclude everything that counteracts it. Now this occurs in one way in the case of the love of concupiscence and in a different way in the case of the love of friendship. For in the case of a love of concupiscence that intensely desires something, one moves against anything that counteracts the attainment or restful enjoyment of what is loved (*illud quod repugnat consecutioni vel fruitioni quietae eius quod amatur*). And it is in this sense that husbands are jealous of their wives, lest the exclusiveness (*singularitas*) that they seek in a wife should be impeded by her familiarity with others. Similarly, someone who seeks excellence is moved against those who seem to excel, as if they were impeding his own excellence. This is the jealousy of envy (*zelus invidiae*) that is spoken of in Psalm 36:1 ("Do not emulate evildoers or be jealous of those who work iniquity"). By contrast, the love of friendship seeks the friend's good, and so when it is intense, it makes a man move against everything that counteracts his friend's good. Accordingly, someone is said to be jealous or zealous on his friend's behalf (*aliquis dicitur zelare pro amico*) when he is eager to repel anything said or done against his friend's good. And, in the same way, someone is likewise said to be jealous or zealous on God's behalf (*zelare pro Deo*) when he tries to repel, as much as he can, what is contrary to God's honor or will this according to 3 Kings 19:14 ("With zeal I have been jealous on behalf of the Lord of hosts"). And a Gloss on John 2:17 ("Zeal for your house consumes me") says, "He is consumed with a good jealousy who seeks to remedy whatever evil he sees; but if he is unable to remedy it, then he bears it and laments it."

#

Reply to objection 1: The Apostle is here talking about the zeal of envy, which is a cause of contending not against what is loved, but on behalf of what is loved and against obstacles to it.

#

Reply to objection 2: A good is loved to the extent that it is communicable to the lover. Hence, everything that impedes the perfection of this communicability becomes odious. And this is the way in which jealousy is caused by loving the good. Now because of a shortage of goodness (ex defectu bonitatis) it happens that certain scarce goods (quaedam parva bona) cannot be fully possessed by many at the same time. And the jealousy of envy is caused by loving goods of this sort. By contrast, the jealousy of envy is not, properly speaking, caused by loving goods that can be fully possessed by many. For instance, no one envies another's cognition of a truth that can be fully possessed by many, though he may perhaps envy another's excellence with respect to the cognition of this truth.

#

Reply to objection 3: The very fact that someone hates the things that counteract what is loved stems from love. Hence, jealousy is properly posited as an effect of love rather than of hatred.

##

First of the Second Part, QUESTION 28, Article 5

Is love a harmful passion?

It seems that love is a harmful passion (*passio laesiva*):

#

Objection 1: Languor' signifies a sort of harm on the part of the one who is languishing (*languor significat laesionem quandam languentis*). But love causes languor; for Song of Songs 2:5 says, "Sustain me with flowers, surround me with apples, because I am languishing with love." Therefore, love is a harmful passion.

#

Objection 2: Melting is a sort of dissolution (*liquefactio est quaedam resolutio*). But love causes melting; for Song of Songs 5:6 says, "My soul melted as my beloved spoke." Therefore, love causes dissolution. Therefore, it is corruptive and harmful.

#

Objection 3: Fervor' (fervor) signifies a certain excess of heat, and this excess is corruptive. But fervor is caused by love; for in *De Caelestis Hierarchy*, chap. 7, Dionysius lists "hot," "sharp," and "highly fervent" among the properties that belong to the Seraphim's love. And Song of Songs 8:6 says of love that "its splendors are the splendors of fire and flames." Therefore, love is a harmful and corruptive passion.

#

But contrary to this: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, "Each thing loves itself in a way that holds it together," i.e., in a way that conserves it (*singula seipsa amant contentive, idest conservative*). Therefore, love is not a harmful passion, but is instead a passion that conserves and perfects.

#

I respond: As was explained above (q. 26, aa. 1-2 and q. 27, a. 1), love' signifies a certain bond (*coaptatio*) between the appetitive power and some good. But nothing is bonded with anything fitting for it by the fact that it is harmed; rather, if it is possible, the thing is advantageous to it and makes it better. By contrast, it is harmed and made worse by the very fact that it is united to something that is not fitting for it. Therefore, love for a fitting good perfects the lover and makes him better (*est perfectivus et meliorativus amantis*), whereas love for a good that is not fitting for the lover is harmful to the lover and makes him worse (*est laesivus et deteriorativus amantis*). Hence, a man is perfected and made better especially by

love for God, whereas he is harmed and made worse by a love for sin this according to Hosea 9:10 ("They became abominable, just like the things they loved"). To be sure, what has just been said about love applies to what is formal in it, i.e., what belongs to the appetite. By contrast, with respect to what is material in the passion of love, viz., the corporeal change, it happens that love might be harmful because of the excessiveness of the change in the same way that this happens in the case of a sensory power and in the case of every act of a power of the soul that is exercised through a change in a corporeal organ.

#

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: To the objections one should reply that four proximate effects can be attributed to love, viz., melting (liquefactio), enjoyment (fruitio), languor (languor), and fervor (fervor). Among these the first is melting, which is opposed to freezing (congelatio). For things that are frozen are compressed within themselves, so that they cannot easily allow themselves to be entered into by another (ut not possint de facili subintrationem alterius pati). But it is part of love that the appetite is adapted to the reception of the good that is loved insofar as what is loved exists in the lover in the way that has already been explained above (a. 2). Hence, the freezing or hardening of the heart (congelatio vel duritia cordis) is a disposition incompatible with love. By contrast, melting' implies a certain softening of the heart by which the heart shows itself ready to be entered into by what is loved. Therefore, if what is loved is present and possessed, then what is effected is pleasure or enjoyment. On the other hand, if what is loved is absent, then two passions result, viz., (a) sadness over the absence, and this is signified by languor' (this is why, in De Tusculanis

Quaestionibus 3, Tully mainly uses the word 'sickness' for this sadness), and (b) intense desire to attain what is loved, and this is signified by fervor'.

These are, to be sure, the effects of love understood formally, i.e., in accord with the relation of the appetitive power to its object. However, in the case of the passion of love there are some effects, proportionate to these, that result from changes in the organ.

##

First of the Second Part, QUESTION 28, Article 6

Does a lover do everything out of love?

It seems that a lover does not do everything out of love:

#

Objection 1: As was explained above (q. 26, a. 2), love is a passion. But a man does not do everything he does out of passion; rather, as Ethics 6 explains, certain things he does by choice and others he does out of ignorance. Therefore, it is not the case that a man does everything he does out of love.

#

Objection 2: As is clear from De Anima 3, the appetite is a principle of movement

and action in all animals. Therefore, if someone does everything he does out of love, then the other passions of the appetitive part of the soul will be superfluous.

#

Objection 3: Nothing is caused simultaneously by contrary causes. But some things are done out of hatred. Therefore, not all things are done out of love.

#

But contrary to this: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, "It is because of the love of the good that each agent does everything."

#

I respond: As has been explained (q. 1, a. 2), every agent acts for the sake of some end. But the end is the good that each thing desires and loves. Hence, it is clear that every agent, whatever it might be, does every action out of some sort of love.

#

Reply to objection 1: This objection goes through for the case of the love that is a passion in the sentient appetite. But we are now talking about love taken in general, insofar as it includes under itself intellectual love, rational love, animal

love, and natural love. For this is how Dionysius is talking about love in De Divinis Nominibus, chap. 4.

#

Reply to objection 2: As has already been explained (q. 27, a. 4), desire, sadness, and pleasure are all caused by love, and as a result all the other passions are caused by love as well. Hence, every action that proceeds from any passion whatsoever also proceeds from love as a first cause. Hence, the other passions, which are proximate causes, are not superfluous.

#

Reply to objection 3: As will be explained below (q. 29, a. 2), hatred is also caused by love.